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It is evident that during the past twenty-five years the use of
the defense of "unavoidable accident" has been increasing in suits
involving automobile accidents. It would seem that the use of this
defense has increased proportionately with the increase in the
number of automobiles on the road. Could it be that this defense
has been overworked, and that some effort should be made to mini-
mize or limit its use? From various court opinions it is obvious that
some jurists are already opposed to the promiscuous use of this
defense. Mr. Justice Speer,' speaking for the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, said:
"We entertain very grave doubt that the question of
unavoidable accident was raised by the evidence, in this
case.... We do not think the various hazards suggested by
counsel argue anything in favor of unavoidable accident-
that is, from some cause other than the negligence of one of
the drivers. To our mind, they only present additional rea-
sons for the use of a greater degree of care on the part of
each to act prudently; that is, to conduct themselves at the
time, in the manner that a reasonably prudent person would
have acted under the same or similar circumstances. To fail
to do so would be negligence and take the case out of the
realm of unavoidable accident....
"It has only been during the last decade that our courts
have required of plaintiffs, seeking damages as a result of
negligence, to assume, in addition to the establishment of
negligence and proximate cause, the burden of showing that
their injuries were not sustained from some other cause-
that of unavoidable accident. However, this added responsi-
bility need not be determined, except and unless there is
evidence tending to show it. There is an inclination of some
of our courts to recognize the necessity of the submission of
that issue to the jury on very slight provocation, a proced-
ure to which we do not subscribe. We believe that issue,
like any other fact issue, should be supported by evidence
of a substantial nature and of such probative force as
would support an answer by the jury."2
In the case, the plaintiff's car had been sideswiped by a city
bus going in the opposite direction on a city street. No evidence was
introduced from which it could be deduced that the accident was
caused by anything but human error and carelessness. Despite the
appearance that the case was "open and shut," the defendant bus
company unsuccessfully based its appeal on the ground that the
trial court had committed prejudicial error in its instruction to
the jury on unavoidable accident.
3
1 Associate Justice, Texas Court of Civil Appeals, Fort Worth, from 1936 to 1950.
2 Hyde v. Marks, 138 S.W.2d 619, 623-24 (Tex, Civ. App. 1940).
3 Hyde v. Marks, supra note 2.
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Another court expressed a similar opinion of the problem in a
very succinct way by saying, "It must be rarely true that when two
people, moving toward a meeting point, both in control of their
movements and relative positions, actually collide, the collision can
be classed as an inevitable accident. ' '4
It is of interest that industrial safety experts attribute only two
per cent of industrial accidents to "unavoidability." 5 This same
source also concluded that approximately eighty-eight per cent of
all industrial accidents are caused by the unsafe acts of persons.,
It seems probable that the percentages of highway accidents which
are either caused by human error or are "unavoidable" would be
very similar to the percentages found in industrial accidents.
The purpose of this note is to examine the trend throughout the
past twenty-five to thirty years to establish how the defense of un-
avoidable accident has been used in automobile accident cases. No
attempt has been made to cover every case in every jurisdiction be-
cause of the overwhelmingly large number of pertinent cases. Ex-
amination of several cases suffices to point out some facets of this
problem. Texas and California have been among the "leaders" in
permitting the use of the defense of unavoidable accident, and are
among the largest contributors to our national highway accident
toll. Consequently they have furnished a large percentage of the
cases involving a plea of unavoidable accident, and many of the
cited cases are taken from these jurisdictions.
A general classification of types of collisions in which the
defense of unavoidable accident has been raised is as follows:
1) Collisions caused by a driver being blinded by bright lights,
poor weather conditions, blowing dust, or obstructions.
2) Collisions in which an automobile skids because of some
highway hazard.
3) Collisions in which some mechanical malfunction is instru-
mental in setting up the conditions leading to the mishap.
4) Collisions in which human error or negligence predomi-
nates as a proximate cause.
Automobile collisions in general, with but one exception, can
be fitted into one or more of these four groups. The one exception
is those collisions caused by a personal failure or mishap, such as
falling asleep at the wheel, driving while intoxicated, or some type
of seizure or illness striking a driver. These personal failures repre-
sent a category by themselves and could well be the subject of
separate study. No attempt is made here to cover this particular
type of accident, nor automobile-train accidents; nor is much
emphasis placed upon automobile-pedestrian accidents. Problems
concerning procedural matters and the presentation of evidence are
also left untouched.
4 Coplan v. Warner, 158 Md. 463, 149 Atl. 1, 3 (1930).




DEFINITIONS OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT AND GENERAL BACKGROUND
An unavoidable accident is "an inevitable occurence, not to be
foreseen and prevented by vigilance, care, and attention,"7 and "is
not occasioned in any degree, directly or remotely, by want of
ordinary care on the part of either person."8 It is "an event which
occurs without the negligence of the plaintiff or defendant,"9 and
occurs "only when the disaster happens from natural causes without
negligence or fault on either side."' 0 It must be an occurrence
"which could not be avoided by that degree of prudence, foresight,
care, and caution which the law requires."" A jury issue of unavoid-
able accident is raised if the evidence shows that there was wet
pavement, skidding, existence of an obstacle that might obstruct the
view of the drivers, or some proximate cause other than the negli-
gence of one of the parties.12 For a mishap to be unavoidable, it is
not necessary.that it be physically impossible to prevent, but it must
be shown that ordinary care and diligence could not have pre-
vented it.'
3
Different views are taken as to the purpose of instructing a
jury upon unavoidable accident. Some jurisdictions feel that by
submitting an instruction on unavoidable accident, the matter will
be brought to the attention of the jury so they will understand it is
not mandatory to find that one of the parties to the suit was to
blame for the accident.14 Parker v. Womack, 15 a widely-cited case
in California, held, with a divided court, that it is a rare occasion
where instructions on unavoidable accident are not appropriate,
unless the defendant is found to be negligent as a matter of law.
This view has been followed many times in California.
The dissent in Parker was based upon the premise that if an
instruction upon unavoidable accident does not add anything to
instructions covering negligence, proximate cause, and burden of
proof, there is no reason to give an instruction on this subject. This
view also has been widely followed in California cases.16 It is
thought that the two rules are not incompatible because of the
narrow qualification in Parker that the instruction is appropriate
only where the question of negligence appears to be a question of
7 Washington, C. & A. Turnpike v. Case, 80 Md. 36, 45, 30 AtI. 571, 573 (1894); accord, Vizzini
v. Dopkin, 176 Md. 639, 6 A.2d 637 (1939).
8 Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Delahoussaye, 124 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
9 Southern Ice & Util. Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex. 82, 95 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1936); accord, Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Price, 114 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1938).
10 Uncapher v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 127 Ohio St. 351, 188 N.E. 553, 556 (1933).
11 Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715, 719 (1931).
12Vergauwen v. Parsons, 294 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (dictum); Winn v. Taylor, 111
S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (dictum).
13 Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957).
14 Wheeler v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 347, 153 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1941); Airline Motor Coaches,
Inc. v. Fields, 140 Tex. 221, 166 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1942); Kuykendall v. Doose, 260
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Kincaid, 19 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929).
1537 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951); accord, McMahon v. Kern County Union High School &
College Dist., 150 Cal. App. 2d 218, 309 P.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1957); Hickenbottom v. Jeppesen, 143
Cal. App. 2d 327, 300 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1956); Carruthers v. Cunha, 133 Cal. App. 2d 91, 283 P. 2d 384
(Ct. App. 1955); Hooper v. Bronsan, 123 Cal. App. 2d 243, 266 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1954); Gall v.
Fowler, 124 Colo. 404, 238 P.2d 187 (1951) (defendant denied right to plead unavoidable accident
when shown that he made illegal U-turn).
16 Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500 (1958); Lloyd v. Southern Pac. Co.,
111 Cal. App. 2d 626, 245 P.2d 583 (1952); McMahon v. Marshall, 111 Cal. App. 2d 248, 244 P.2d
481 (1952); accord, Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957); see Jaeger v. Chap-
man, 95 Cal. App. 2d 520, 213 P.2d 404 (1950).
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fact. It is likely that a court would permit the giving of such
instructions, unless the issue of negligence was not present by any
stretch of the imagination.
Where an accident is caused by negligence, there is no place
for application of the doctrine. In order to properly bring a case
within the rules of unavoidable accident, it is not sufficient that the
injury was inevitable at the time, because one who by his own
negligence has brought about, or failed to remedy, a dangerous con-
dition or situation is liable for a resulting injury to another. This is
true even though the injury could not have been prevented in view
of the conditions or situation existing at the time of the accident.
One who seeks to avail himself of the protection of the rule must
first show that he was in no way to blame for the happening. It is
also thought that a defendant who is responsible for his own negli-
gent act which by chance was combined with an unavoidable acci-
dent, cannot rightfully avail himself of the defense of unavoidable
accident.17
It is apparent from the definitions which the courts have
approved that the unavoidable accident is closely akin to those
catastrophes which the law categorized as acts of God, or vis major.
Black18 defines act of God as "an act occasioned exclusively by
violence of nature without the interference of any human agency.
It means a natural necessity proceeding from physical causes alone
without the intervention of man." Properly speaking, both acts of
God and unavoidable accidents may be denoted as inevitable acci-
dents, with the former being connected with natural forces, and the
latter being connected with human agency. In either case, there
is a freedom from human negligence, and the accident is one which
could not have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable caution
or prudence.
With freedom from negligence being one of the principal ele-
ments of an unavoidable accident, it is elementary that a defense
17 See Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957); Barlow v. North Sterling Irr. Dist.,
85 Colo. 488, 277 Pac. 469 (1929) (act of God must be sole cause, and if negligence of defendant
contributed to act of God in causing damage, defendant is liable); Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v.
Swartz, 83 Colo. 225, 263 Pac. 728 (1928).
18 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). See Blythe v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 15 Colo. 333, 25 Pac.
702 (1890) (wind); Grand Valley Irr. Co. v. Pitzer, 14 Colo. App. 123, 59 Poc. 420 (1899) (unprecedented
storm caused canal to overflow); Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Andrews, 11 Colo. App. 204, 53 Pac. 518
(1898) (snowslide).
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of unavoidable accident cannot exist concurrently with general or
contributory negligence. Nor can the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
apply where an injury is inflicted by an act of God, or is the result
of an unavoidable accident. 19 As Mr. Justice Speer pointed out in
his attack upon the misuse of the defense of unavoidable accident, a
determination that the accident was unavoidable eliminates all
other theories of how the accident could have happened. Blashfield,
in his work on automobile law, says:
"A party is not entitled to an instruction on the theory
of an unavoidable accident, in the absence of any evidence
on which to base it, or upon pleadings not raising the issue
.... Also, where the accident could not have happened with-
out negligence or contributory negligence, it is error to
instruct as to unavoidable accident.
20
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND MECHANICAL MALFUNCTIONS
Reference to the definitions of unavoidable accident shows that
all of these definitions hinge upon the "reasonable and prudent
man" theory which requires that everyone be charged with respon-
sibility for those acts which could have been prevented by the
exercise of that care which the law requires. The Restatement of
Torts21 sums up the general rule thus:
"When an act is negligent if done without reasonable
care, the care which the actor is required to exercise to
avoid being negligent in the doing of the act is that which
he, as a reasonable man, should recognize as necessary to
prevent the act from creating an unreasonable risk of harm
to another.
22
Hand in hand with this rule concerning the duty of a reason-
ably prudent man when doing an act which would be negligence
if not done with reasonable care, is another rule:
"It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether a
human being or thing, which the actor knows or should
know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or defective,
that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
others.
23
Comment c, of the same rule, expands this theory, by saying
in part:
[TIhe duty of preparation includes a generally
operative duty of inspection where the circumstances are
such as would lead a reasonable man to believe that an in-
spection is necessary, as where the thing used is one likely
to deteriorate by previous use or other causes or where the
actor has some other reason for suspecting that the article
19 Frenkil v. Johnson, 175 Md. 592, 3 A.2d 479 (1939).
-20 tOc SBashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 6698 (perm, ed. 1957).
_21-Restatement, Torts § 298 (1934).
22 See also Id. § 289 (when the actor should recognize the existence of risk); id. 1 302 (acts involving
risk of either direct or indirect harm).
23 Id. § 307.
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1959
may be defective. '24
It would seem from these three rules defining the general re-
sponsibilities of a reasonable man in either performing hazardous
acts or using instrumentalities which could be dangerous if not
properly used, that these rules would be applicable to automobiles.
Automobiles, like any other machines, tend to deteriorate with .age
and use. Malfunctions may occur at any time, and while most of
them would be inconsequential, some could result in calamity if
the failure were to occur while one were driving. What duty does
John Q. Citizen owe to his fellow man to maintain his automobile
in the best possible operating condition? One sometimes wonders
after being passed on the highway by a rolling junk pile being
driven twice as fast as it should be.
In general, the courts have been rather lenient in permitting
defendants to use the defense of unavoidable accident in suits where
some malfunction of the defendant's car caused the collision.
In Otto v. Sellnow, 25 the court held that an accident occasioned
by a tire blowout was an unavoidable accident and therefore there
was no liability on the part of the owner or operator. In this case,
the evidence showed that there was at least 1,300 pounds of passen-
gers and equipment in the car at the time of the accident. Though
such a load could not fairly be considered excessive, what con-
clusion should the court have reached had the load been twice or
three times that figure? Should not the court attempt, as in Otto, to
determine if the defendant's tires were known to be faulty or de-
fective? It would be illogical indeed to cite this case as standing for
the proposition that if one has a blowout, he may always plead un-
avoidable accident, and automatically be relieved of any liability.
The Restatement of Torts26 again provides a logical guide for such
instances. To stay in strict accordance with the definitions of un-
avoidable accident, it would seem that the defendant in such a case
should first have the burden of proving that he was not negligent.
Only when the defendant successfully proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that he has not been negligent, should the court
permit an instruction upon unavoidable accident.
Oklahoma Power & Water Co. v. Howell27 involved an unusual
situation. One of the defendant's trucks was on one shoulder of
the highway using a winch line to pull another truck stuck in the
ditch on the opposite side. When the plaintiff attempted to make an
emergency stop upon approaching the defendant's trucks, he dis-
covered that the brakes on his truck were inoperative because the
rear axle of his truck had broken without his knowledge. The plain-
tiff was helpless as he rolled headlong down a steep slope and
smashed into the taut winch line stretched across the highway. De-
spite the appearance of a prima facie case of negligence, the jury
found neither party to be negligent. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
approved the giving of an instruction on unavoidable accident.
24 Id. § 307, comment c.
25 233 Minn. 215, 46 N.W.2d 641 (1951).
26 Restatement, Torts 1 307, comment c (1934).
27 201 Okla. 615, 207 P.2d 937 (1949).
DICTA
SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1959
Could not questions similar to those raised above be posed in such
an instance as this?
In the Howell case, the court held that the defendant power
company was not required to anticipate such an accident, since they
could reasonably expect that an approaching vehicle would have
ample opportunity to size up the situation correctly and come to
a safe stop. Evidence showed that the plaintiff had been able to
see the trucks some 3,000 feet away. Yet this distance would give
the driver of a car who was driving sixty miles per hour only
thirty-four seconds to determine that the hazard existed and come
to a safe stop. Driving safety literature shows that at sixty miles
per hour on a dry highway, an ordinary driver requires 66 feet for
'reaction time' and 296 feet for braking distance, or a total of 362 feet
in which to stop.2 8 Subtracting this distance from the 3,000 feet
in the Howell case leaves 2,638 feet, or only thirty seconds to de-
termine that a hazard exists before beginning to apply the brakes.
This time would be shortened considerably in a case such as this,
however, because it is questionable that one could see a cable across
the road at a distance of more than a few hundred feet. Obviously
it would be necessary to detect such a cable before one could even
realize the existence of the hazard. It is also anomalous that one
could drive a truck without knowing that the rear axle was broken.
Yet, these questions went unasked and unanswered.
In other cases, it has been held an unavoidable accident when a
shackle bolt on the front springs broke, throwing the car out of
control and into another car,29 and also when the breaking of a
truck's rear axle left the truck astraddle of railroad tracks a short
time before a speeding train struck it.3"
In Alward v. Paola,3 1 the defendant's car went out of control
on a steep downhill slope of a winding three-lane highway when the
car's brakes apparently failed. After a wild ride, around many
curves, the defendant struck the rear of one car and careened head-
on into the plaintiff's approaching car. Conflicting evidence was pre-
sented in which the defendant swore that her brake pressure had
been entirely gone. Plaintiff's witnesses and the investigating of-
ficers, however, testified to seeing long skid marks which could have
been made only by the defendant's car. Others testified that the de-
fendant's brakes were found to be satisfactory immediately after
the accident and also in the repair garage. Defense testimony was
given by expert mechanics who offered a plausible and valid reason
why one's brakes could fail for a short time and then be restored.
The court held that instructions on sudden peril and unavoidable
accident were appropriate if substantiated by the evidence, and that
since it could be said that there was evidence to sustain the jury's
finding that the defendant was not negligent, the judgment for the
defendant must be affirmed.32
28 American Auto. Assoc., Minimum Stopping Distances Chart (1957).
29 Seele v. Purcell, 45 N.M. 176, 113 P.2d 320 (1941).
30 Union Pac. R.R. v. Shupe, 131 Colo. 271, 280 P.2d 1115 (1955).
31 79 Cal. App. 2d 1, 179 P,2d 5 (Ct. App. 1947).
32 Cf. Merry v. Knudsen Creamery, 94 Cal. App. 2d 715, 211 P.2d 905 (1949) (instruction on
unavoidable accident proper where defendant claimed brakes failed despite testimony that brakes
had been inspected and adjusted day before accident).
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Ridley v. Young,38 a fairly recent Colorado case, presents a
difficult question concerning unavoidable accident. It is difficult to
reconcile the holding in this case with the stand taken in the Re-
statement of Torts.3 4 The plaintiff was riding with the defendant
in the defendant's car. Conflicting evidence was presented as to who
was driving at the time of the accident, but the car was being
driven at a high rate of speed despite the defendant's knowledge
that his brakes were not correctly adjusted and were prone to lock.
While travelling at a high rate of speed, the car overturned, and
the plaintiff was injured. Conflicting testimony was given con-
cerning whether the accident was caused by the locking of a
front wheel brake or by a tire blowout. Upon appeal from a
judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff alleged it was erroneous
for the trial court to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident.
The supreme court approved the giving of the instruction since it
was felt that there were logical inferences which might have been
drawn from the evidence to the effect that the accident was caused
by conditions over which the driver had no control, and of which
he had no knowledge.
Broken steering mechanisms are often causes of collisions.
Generally, the courts will consider such a mishap to be an unavoid-
abie accident. This is understandable, particularly because of the
suddenness with which such a mishap occurs. Typical of such acci-
dents are those described in Iacino v. Brown,35 Doggett v. Lacey,36
and White v. Ackers.3 7 In these cases, the courts held that the de-
fendants were victims of unavoidable accidents and therefore not
liable. A different result was reached, however, in Humphries v.
Gray,38 The steering mechanism of the defendant's car suddenly
broke as she approached the plaintiff on a gravelled road. The
breaking of the steering mechanism drag link was attributed to the
shock encountered when the defendant's car struck a small pile of
gravel in the road just before the collision. The evidence, however,
tended to show that the defendant was driving too fast for the
condition of the road. The court affirmed the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident, and held that any
damage to the steering mechanism was due to the defendant's negli-
gence in driving faster than warranted by the condition of the
road.
The stand taken by the Restatement of Torts39 is illustrated by
the opinion in a recent California case40 where the defendant's
brakes failed and he was so frightened that he forgot to use his
emergency brake. The defendant's car was six years old, but his
33 127 Colo. 40, 2-3 e ?d 433 (1953).
34 Restatement, Torts 9 307, comment c (1934).
35 121 Colo. 450, 217 P.2d 266 (1950).
36 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1932).
37 125 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
38 305 Ky. 206, 203 S.W.2d 8 (1947).
39 Restatement, Torts §§ 289, 298, 302, and 307 (1934).
40Alarid v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd 50 Col. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897
1958) (two justices dissenting).
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brakes had been inspected within the prior two months. The court,
in approving an instruction upon unavoidable accident, said:
"In the driving of automobiles such brake failures are
not unknown and they frequently come suddenly, without
any warning. The average driver is not a mechanical ex-
pert, and is not necessarily in a position to anticipate such a
mechanical failure. The essential question in such a case
is not as to exactly what caused the mechanical failure but
is as to whether he had or should have had some prior
knowledge of facts which should have led him to take proper
steps in advance which might have prevented the brake
failure."
4 1
Interesting conjectures arise when one considers the manda-
tory motor vehicle safety inspections which are now required by
many states. Do these inspections relieve the owner of an automo-
bile from legal responsibility for inspecting his car between these
periodic inspections required by the state? Is liability removed
when such an owner is involved in a collision resulting from faulty
brakes only a short time after one of these safety inspections?
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT AND DRIVER ERROR
It is unquestionable that the vast majority of automobile col-
lisions are attributable in some way to human error and poor judg-
ment. Everyone who drives a car at one time or another has en-
countered, for example, drivers who delight in pulling in and out
of traffic like a broken-field runner in a football game. The list of
the other types of such "damn fool" drivers is long. Yet, in many
instances, defendants who are in court because of collisions result-
ing from driver error and poor judgment will plead unavoidable
accident. It is indeed fortunate that the courts have rarely permit-
ted such pleas to be accepted.
Arrendell v. Wells 42 was one of the rare cases in which the
court accepted the plea. The plaintiff's son was killed in a head-on
collision which happened when the defendant suddenly swerved
onto the opposite side of the highway so that he could turn left onto
an intersecting road. The court approved the giving of an instruc-
tion upon unavoidable accident to the jury. Nevertheless, the jury
still found that such a mishap was not unavoidable, and found the
defendant guilty of negligence, which was affirmed by the appellate
court. A similar situation is found in Price v. Leon.
43
These two cases are definitely minority viewpoints and it is
obvious that the courts are becoming even tougher where a collision
is caused by such negligence. As pointed out in many cases, it is
error to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident where it is
apparent that nothing obstructed the view of the drivers, the con-
dition of the highway was not to blame, and no mechanical failure
or other intervening cause occurred.44 Typical of situations where
41317 P.2d at 112.
42 149 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
43 202 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
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the courts have refused to instruct on unavoidable accident is Dallas
Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Darden.45 Here the plaintiff's car was struck
by a street car as the plaintiff pulled out of a parking space. Mr.
Justice Leddy said:
"It would be going too far to say that, when a street car
and an automobile are operated upon a street, under such
conditions as are here shown, a collision could not be
avoided by due and proper care upon the part of both
parties. To so hold would be in effect to declare that in all
cases where a collision occurs between a street car and an
automobile the issue of unavoidable accident is necessarily
presented.
'46
In Menefee v. State,47 the defendant in a criminal prosecution
pleaded that it was an unavoidable accident when he struck a
child after he passed a school bus that was unloading passengers.
The court held that it was not an unavoidable accident since the
mishap would have been avoided had the defendant complied with
the state statute48 which made it mandatory for motorists to stop
when encountering a school bus loading or unloading passengers.
The stiffer attitude which has been taken by the courts in re-
cent years is demonstrated in Harrison v. King.49 The defendant,
while driving at high speed, passed and sideswiped the plaintiff's
truck. The defendant, in pleading unavoidable accident, alleged that
as she began to pull around the truck, the left front wheel of her
car went off the opposite edge of the highway, thereby causing her
to lose control of her car. The court held that the collision was the
result of her negligence, and, therefore, was not an unavoidable
accident. The court's stand was perhaps influenced by the disclosure
that the defendant had straightened her wheels and continued
abreast of the defendant for some time before finally colliding.
Carr v. Boyd 50 points out that Colorado has also taken a stern
attitude where the facts do not indicate that the mishap was an un-
avoidable accident. The defendant became impatient when she
found herself behind a slow line of highway traffic. Upon pulling
out of line in an attempt to pass several cars, she found herself
trapped when the gap in the traffic closed up. Unable to pull back
into line, she collided head on with the plaintiff's approaching car.
Mr. Justice Holland, speaking for the court, concluded that there
44 E.g., McCarthy Oil & Gas Corp. v. Cunningham, 255 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Chesshir
v. Nail, 218 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Collins v. Smith, 175 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Johnson v. Hodges, 121 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Younger Bros., Inc. v. Power, 118 S.W.2d
954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
45 38 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931). C.f. Jaeger v. Chapman, 95 Cal. App. 2d 520, 213
P.2d 404 (1950) (defendant while speeding struck plaintiff's car when plaintiff slowed to make left
turn); Kaley v. Huntley, 88 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935) (plaintiff while passenger in defendant's
car was injured in collision which happened when defendant-driver turned head to talk to passenger
in rear seat); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1935); Brewer v. Berner, 15 Wash. 2d 644, 131 P.2d 940 (1942).
46 Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Darden, supra note 45 at 779.
47 87 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935).
48 Tex. Penal Code §§ 301b(!)-(2) (Vernon 1931).
49 296 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
50 123 Colo. 350, 229 P.2d 659 (1951); cf. Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 240 P.2d 822 (1952)
(reversible error to give instruction on unavoidable accident where collision at intersection was such
an occurence as could have been avoided by exercise of due care); Gall v. Fowler, 124 Colo. 404, 238
P.2d 187 (1951) (no issue warranting submission of instruction on unavoidable accident where plain-
tiff on motor scooter struck defendant's car as defendant made unlawful U-turn).
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was no issue of unavoidable accident raised where the collision was
the result of the defendant using such poor judgment as to place
herself in a hazardous position from which she could not extricate
herself.
The stand taken by the Colorado Supreme Court in Carr v. Boyd
is unquestionably supported by the Restatement of Torts:51
"The actor should recognize that his conduct involves
a risk of causing an invasion of another's interest, if a per-
son,
(a) possessing such perception of the surrounding cir-
cumstances as a reasonable man would have . . .
would infer that the act creates an appreciable
chance of causing such invasion."
In line with the policies of most states as reflected in statutes
concerned with driver financial responsibility,52 compulsory driver's
license examinations, 53 and procedure to revoke or suspend the
license of any habitually reckless driver,54 it would seem that the
courts should maintain their present stern attitude against those
drivers who are "an accident going some place to happen."
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND THE SUDDEN STOP
The number of rear-end collisions which one hears about is
some indication of the frequent occurrence of this type of collision.
A recent law review article points out the frequency of this type
of collision, and vividly illustrates one type of the more serious
injuries which may result from such collisions.5  As may well be
expected, many defendants have alleged unavoidable accident after
a grinding rear-end smashup. The courts, however, have been rather
reluctant to permit the raising of the defense of unavoidable acci-
dent. The courts are strongly reinforced in this position by statutes
requiring drivers to maintain proper intervals between moving
vehicles. 56
In Town & Country Securities Co. v. Place,57 the plaintiff
was waiting at a red light when his car was struck from the rear.
The defendant testified that when his foot slipped off the brake
pedal his car had rolled forward only three feet before striking the
plaintiff's car. Despite a plea of unavoidable accident, the court
affirmed the trial court's action in refusing to instruct the jury
upon unavoidable accident. Similarly, the court in Leeper v. Nel-
son58 refused to reverse a judgment for the plaintiff where it was
51 Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934).
52 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-7-1 through 13-7-39 (1953).
53 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-3-10 (Supp. 1956).
54 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. I 13-3-24(c) (Supp. 1956).
55 Zarlengo, Whiplash Injuries, 36 DICTA 285 (1959).
56 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-45 (1953) (driver shall not follow more closely than reasonable
with regard to speed, traffic, and condition of highway).
57 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165 (1955). But see Davis v. Ewen, 148 Cal. App. 2d 410, 306 P.2d
908 (1957) (not error to give instruction on unavoidable accident even though one might well have
anticipated a sudden stop); Kuykendall v. Doose, 260 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
58,139 Cal. App. 2d 65, 293 P.2d 111 (1956). But see Hooper v. Bronson, 123 Cal. App. 2d 243,
266 P.2d 590 (1954) (intersection crash while plaintiff waiting for traffic to pass before turning).
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shown that the defendant had struck the plaintiff's car as the
plaintiff was waiting at an intersection to make a left turn. The
defendant had averred that the collision was an unavoidable acci-
dent because the "Go" signal arm was up. The court rejected the
defense when it was shown, however, that the lights themselves
were working properly.
Conversely, the courts in certain instances have permitted the
defendant to plead unavoidable accident in rear-end collision cases.
A typical instance when the defense of unavoidable accident would
be valid is found in a California case where the defendant's brakes
failed. The defense was thought to be valid in the light of evidence
that the brakes on the defendant's truck had been inspected and
adjusted the preceding evening.5 9
Rear-end collisions while both vehicles are moving are fairly
common also. The defense of unavoidable accident was permitted in
Lynch v. Defino6,5 0 where the plaintiff, a motorcycle policeman,
was injured when his motorcycle skidded and overturned. The
plaintiff had swerved to avoid the defendant's car as it turned left
at an intersection. The court held that an instruction upon unavoid-
able accident was proper when it was shown that the plaintiff did
not sound his siren until just before entering the intersection.
Moving rear-end collisions, generally, result in the defendant
being found guilty of negligance. Courts have refused to permit
the defense of unavoidable accident where it was shown that the
plaintiff, who slowed down to let an approaching car clear a nar-
row bridge before he himself entered it, was not so close in front
of the defendant as to prevent the defendant from stopping safely.6 1
UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENTS AND POOR VISIBILITY
It is only reasonable to believe that the prudent driver should
be required to slow down, if possible to do so safely, when he is
unable to see where he is going. Yet this is not always the case.
Many exceptions have been made in various circumstances. There
is a multiplicity of cases concerning a collision where one or both
of the drivers has been blinded by such things as bright lights, fog,
smoke, dust, snow, or obstructions.
An excellent annotation 62 on the rule requiring a blinded driver
to stop, summarizes the prevailing view thusly:
"(Practical) considerations have caused considerable
dissatisfaction with the rule requiring the blinded motorist
to stop, and while some courts continue to apply it with con-
59 Merry v. Knudsen Creamery, 94 Cal. App. 2d 715, 211 P.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1949); accord, Alarid
v. Vanier, 317 P.2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957), aff'd, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958) (defendant's
brakes failed although they had been inspected within two months).
60 114 Cal. App. 2d 128, 249 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1952).
61 Kelly v. Employers Cas. Co. 202 Okla. 437, 214 P.2d 925 (1950); cf. Schmid v. Eslick, 181
Kan. 997, 317 P.2d 459 (1957)( defendant pulled onto highway in front of plaintiff and was struck
before he could get up speed).
62 Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 298-99 (1952). (Footnotes omitted.)
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siderable strictness, others have rejected it for the rule that
the duty of a motorist so blinded is determinable by the
standard of the ordinary care exercised by a reasonably pru-
dent person under the same circumstances . . . [0] thers,
while recognizing the rule as generally controlling, have
held that it must be applied in the light of the particular
circumstances prevailing at the time . . (The rule) is
subject to a number of exceptions and qualifications, de-
pending upon such factors as traffic conditions, such as
whether the blinded motorist was closely followed by an-
other car, the nature and visibility of the object obstructing
the road, and the suddenness of the blinding.
'63
Weather conditions represent a goodly portion of the "blinded
driver" cases. In Vizzini v. Dopkin,6 4 the court rejected the de-
fendant's stand that it was an unavoidable accident when he struck
63 For an excellent discussion of the "blinding lights" rule, see comment,The Range of Vision &
Blinding Lights Rules in Automobile Accident Cases, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 498 (1935). Compare Dixie
Ohio Express Co. v. Vickery, 306 Ky. 171, 206 S.W.2d 821 (1947) (collision on overpass when parties
blinded by smoke from train passing below; parties had duty to exercise ordinary care and when
blinded should stop).












a pedestrian at an intersection. The defendant's plea was refused
despite evidence showing that the defendant's vision had been im-
paired by sleet and freezing rain. The court held that it was no
excuse that the poor weather conditions had reduced the defend-
ant's vision and that such conditions should instead serve to make
him more vigilant and subject him to a greater degree of respon-
sibility.6 5 Other cases6" have held that in the absence of any evidence
tending to show that the accident was due to other reasons, it is
proper to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident when a
driver's limited vision was the proximate cause of the mishap.
Biladeau v. Pomerenke 7 presents a unique set of circumstances.
The plaintiff's car was forced into a roadside snow bank by another
car which left the scene without stopping. While the plaintiff was
extricating himself from the snow bank, and his car was diagonally
across the road, a nearby snow-removal machine, which had been
stopped, started down the road. The resulting snow cloud blinded
the approaching defendant truck driver so that he was unable to
see the plaintiff's car until too late to avoid the collision. The court
held that it was proper to instruct upon unavoidable accident, and
that the defendant had not had a duty to slow down when he came
to the snow cloud since it was a moving cloud and was only tem-
porary in nature.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in Jacobsen v. McGinness,6
followed reasoning similar to that used in Parker v. Womack,"9
which was discussed above. In Jacobsen, the plaintiff was travelling
down a gravel road when an oil transport truck approached and
passed him. The passing truck created a large dust cloud which blew
across the road toward the plaintiff's side. While the dust was still
thick, one of the defendants, who was travelling behind the trans-
port truck and in the midst of the dust, suddenly swerved to the
left and collided head on with the plaintiff. A third car, driven by
a co-defendant, was so close behind the plaintiff that it too smashed
into the plaintiffs car.
No reason was given for the defendant's sudden move into the
plaintiff's path. The plaintiff appealed an adverse decision from the
trial court, charging that it was a prejudicial error for that court
to instruct the jury upon unavoidable accident. The supreme court
held that it was prima facie evidence of the defendant's negligence
65 Cf. McBride v. Woods, 124 Colo. 384, 238 P.2d 183 (1951) (driver backed into pedestrian in
cross-walk; not unavoidable accident); Ramsey v. Sharpley, 294 Ky. 286, 171 S.W.2d 427 (1943)
(defendant hit jaywalker; not unavoidable accident since driver obligated to give timely warning of
approach of vehicle); Red Arrow Freight Lines v. Smith, 93 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (truck
hit child in school zone when child darted in front of truck; not unavoidable occident since driver
failed to use ordinary care upon seeing school zone signs). But cf., Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d
361, 191 P.2d 25 (Ct. App. 1948) (truck backed into child while unloading dirt on school yard; un-
avoidable accident since driver was using due care under circumstances that children were supervised
and had been repeatedly warned of hazard); Lofland v. Jackson, 237 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)
(unavoidable accident when driver suddenly blinded by sun and struck pedestrian walking in shadows).
66 Hinkle v. Union Transfer Co., 229 F.2d 403 (10th Cir. 1955) (unavoidable accident where driver
unable to see stopped truck alongside road because of bright headlights and blinding rain); Maloney
v. Jussel, 125 Colo. 125, 241 P.2d 862 (1952) (sleet and ice on windshield) (reversed on other
grounds); Rainey v. McMillian, 271 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (rain); Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
Delahoussaye, 124 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (raining and windows fogged).
67 33 Wash. 2d 145, 204 P.2d 518 (1949).
68 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957).
69 37 Cal. 2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951).
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that her car was on the wrong side of the road. The court felt that
the instruction on unavoidable accident tended to divert the minds
of the jurors from .tht':dci ive issues of negligence and contributory
negligence, and agreed with the plaintiff that the instruction sug-
gested that the defendants might be held blameless for reasons
other than their freedom from negligence. In reversing and directing
that a new trial be had on the issue of damages only, the court held
that the facts amply demonstrated that the accident was not un-
avoidable. The court concluded by saying that it required no ex-
ceptional skill, foresight, or care on the part of the defendant to stay
on her side of the road.
The decision in Jacobsen represents an excellent and reasonable
reconciliation of the majority and minority views set forth in Parker
v. Womack. Such a mishap most certainly should be considered as
being proximately caused by an action considered negligent as a
matter of law, and, therefore, not subject to being denoted as un-
avoidable. Where such a course is followed, there is little doubt that
the rights of both parties will be equally protected. 70
Other cases involving collisions where a driver was blinded by
dust have used similar approaches to reach a decision. It was held
that an instruction on unavoidable accident was properly refused
where the plaintiff's vision was restricted by a cloud of dust cre-
ated by the defendant as he pulled onto the highway in front of the
plaintiff.7 1 It was proper, however, to instruct on unavoidable acci-
dent where the collision with the plaintiff happened when the de-
fendant's vision was cut off by a cloud of dust which the defendant
created in pulling off the highway to avoid a collision with the third
car. The instruction was approved because the court felt that the
question of determination should be left to the jury since a third
person was instrumental in causing the mishap.
72
The requirement of due care, as might be expected, is followed
in those cases involving an intersection collision where the vision
of one or both drivers was obstructed. 73 The driver, if exercising due
care, is blameless, if the jury finds that he could not have reasonably
expected to anticipate the collision.
74
Two unique cases arose when the defendant in each case failed
to see a poorly-lighted slow-moving vehicle on the highway and
smashed into the rear of the slower vehicle. In one of these cases, 5
it was held proper to submit an instruction upon unavoidable acci-
dent when it was shown that the plaintiff's horse-drawn wagon
was lawfully on the highway and had complied with the statutory
requirements dealing with rear reflectors. It was also considered to
be an unavoidable accident where the defendant struck the rear of
a potato digger being towed behind the plaintiff's tractor at night.
70 See discussion and cases cited in notes 15 and 16, supra.
71Trevillian v. Boswell, 241 Ky. 237, 43 S.W.2d 715 (1931). Compare Winn v. Taylor, 111
S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (defendant lost his direction in a dust cloud raised by passing
truck and collided with second truck following first truck; instruction was proper).
72 Webb v. Hardin, 53 Ariz. 310, 89 P.2d 30 (1939).
73 E.g., Hodgson v. Paul, 16 N.J. Super. 87, 83 A.2d 783 (App. Div. 1951); Stovall v. Whatley,
183 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
74 Flemings' Fraternal Undertaking Co. v. Quarrells, 116 S.W.2d 1160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
75 Valley Film Service v. Cruz, 173 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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Neither the tractor nor the digger was equipped with reflectors or
tail lights, and only a small spotlight was showing from the rear
of the tractor. The court concluded that the potato digger was not
a "motor vehicle" within the scope of the statutory requirements
that motor vehicles must be equipped with tail lights and reflec-
tors.7
6
THE UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, SKIDS, AND
THE DOCTRINE OF SUDDEN PERIL
Approved definitions of an unavoidable accident frequently in-
clude skidding as one of the factors which may properly raise a
question of unavoidable accident. 77 As might be expected, there is
a tremendous number of cases involving skidding. Only a few of
'the more typical and some unusual cases are discussed here to illus-
trate the usual determinations.
7
Stephens v. Lung79 typifies the viewpoint in Colorado. The
defendant began to skid when he was forced to swerve to avoid
striking another car which pulled in front of him. The defendant's
skid left him powerless to avoid sliding headon into the plaintiff's
approaching car. The court held that the mishap was unavoidable.
Similar holdings have been made in Maloney v. Jusse8 0 and in
cases in other jurisdictions."1 However, the requirement of due care
must still be met. Where it is apparent to a reasonable and prudent
driver that the road is hazardous, he must exercise greater caution.
Under such circumstances, if a mishap does happen, the defendant
may not successfully plead unavoidable accident unless it is shown
that he has exercised the care which a prudent driver would use
under those conditions.
8 2
The Restatement of Torts8 3 states the well established doctrine
of sudden peril thusly:
"In determining whether conduct is negligent toward
another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden
emergency not caused by his own tortious conduct which
requires rapid decision is a factor in determining the rea-
sonable character of his choice of action."
As might be expected, the doctrine of sudden peril is appli-
cable to situations in which the issue of unavoidable accident may
be involved. In accordance with the sudden peril doctrine, the
measure of what a reasonable and prudent driver would be ex-
pected to do depends upon the circumstances of the case.
76 Turner v. Purdum, 77 Idaho 130, 289 P.2d 608 (1955) (digger was "implement of husbandry").
But rf. Comment, 35 DICTA 203 (1958).
77 E.g., Herdt v. Darbin, 126 Colo. 355, 249 P.2d 822 (1952); Vergouwen v. Parsons, 294 S.W.2d
863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Chesshir v. Nail, 218 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Winn v Taylor,
111 S.W.2d 1149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
78 See I Part 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice § 635 (perm. ed. 1957)
for cases involvinq skidding.
79 133 Colo. 560, 298 P.2d 960 (1956).
80 125 Colo. 125, 241 P.2d 862 (1952).
81 E.g., Airline Motor Coaches, Inc. v. Fields, 140 Tex. 221, 166 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1942); Blasberg v. Cockrell, 254 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Blanton v. E. & L. Transp. Co,
203 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
82 Knox v. Barnard, 181 Kan. 943, 317 P.2d 452 (1957); accord, Restatement, Torts § 289 (1934).
83 Restatement, Torts 1 296 (1934).
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In general, the courts have been generous in permitting in-
structions on unavoidable accident in situations which ordinarily, if
not for an emergency, would tend to show negligence by one or
both parties. For example, it is usually considered prima facie evi-
dence of negligence for a driver to be on the wrong side of the
highway.8 4 Despite this burden of overcoming such prima facie evi-
dence, defendants have often invoked the doctrine of sudden peril,
and have been permitted to plead unavoidable accident.8 5 The
courts, however, will not permit an instruction on unavoidable
accident where the defendant makes an invalid claim of sudden
peril. Typical of this position is Fogle v. Phillips, 6 where the de-
fendent collided head on with the plaintiff just after topping a hill.
The defendant argued that the jury should have been instructed
upon unavoidable accident since he had been forced to swing over
onto the far side of the road to avoid some pedestrians on the oppo-
site side of the hill. The court refused the defendant's claim of sudden
peril when it was shown that the defendant had been going only
twenty-five miles per hour and that the pedestrians had been about
one hundred feet from the top of the hill. The court concluded that
the defendant had had sufficient time in which to return to his
right side of the road and thereby avoid the collision.
The congestion of modern highways and streets, and the speed
at which automobiles normally operate, make it difficult to apply
any hard and fast rules. Strict application of rules is being tem-
pered with common sense in order to reach a balance with the
prevalent desires of the public to reach their destination in a hurry.
Automobile law is perhaps one of the fastest changing phases of
modern law. Although basic principles of law must remain un-
changed, it will be necessary for the modern judicial system to
apply these rules so that justice and equity will still be reached.
84 E.g., Jacobsen v. McGinness, 135 Colo. 357, 311 P.2d 696 (1957).
85 E.g., Creamer v. Cerrato, 1 Cal. App. 2d 441, 36 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1934) (driver swerved
to avoid child who darted into street); Tate v. Collins, 266 Ky. 322, 98 S.W.2d 938 (1936) (driver
swerved to avoid child who darted into street); Frei v. Brownlee, 56 N.M. 677, 248 P.2d 671 (1951)
(vehicle parked on highway required driver to swerve away resulting in collision with approaching
vehicle); Swift & Co. v. Eanes, 92 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (vehicle parked on highway
required driver to swerve away resulting in collision with approaching vehicle).
86 191 Md. 114, 60 A.2d 198 (1948).
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